Email Header Analyzer
Paste the raw headers of a message and see where it actually came from: every hop with its delay, what SPF, DKIM and DMARC decided, and when they disagree, why. Nothing leaves your browser.
This tool has just launched. Unlimited checks, no sign-up, no payment. If a result looks wrong, tell us — that is the most useful feedback we can get right now.
What an email header is and why read it
A message has two parts. The body is the text you see when you open it. The header is the service block in front of it, which mail clients hide, even though it explains where the message came from, which servers it passed through, and whether the name in the From line can be trusted.
Some fields are familiar: From, To, Subject, Date. The catch is that the sender fills in those four, and faking them is no harder than typing any other text. The value of a header lies in the fields that servers add along the way and the sender cannot control. Received is added by every hop, so the chain, read bottom up, shows the real route. Authentication-Results holds the receiving side's verdict on SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Return-Path holds the address bounces go to, and it often differs from From.
That is where the value comes from. The header tells you whether the message was sent by who it claims, explains delays through the timestamps in Received, and shows why a message went to spam if the filter recorded a reason. Paste it into the form above and the analysis lays all of this out.
The analysis happens in your browser
Message headers are not neutral technical data. They carry the sender's and recipients' addresses, the subject line, the names of internal servers, and often the identifiers a company would rather not publish. That is why this tool does its work locally: the text you paste is parsed by JavaScript on this page and never sent anywhere.
It is worth saying plainly rather than burying in a privacy policy: we cannot lose what we never receive. It also means the analysis works with the page open and the network gone.
How to get the headers
Every client hides them somewhere different, and the wording changes between versions. What you are looking for is the raw source or the "original" view.
- Gmail: open the message, three dots in the top right, Show original. The headers are at the top of the page that opens.
- Outlook on the web: three dots, View, View message details.
- Outlook desktop: open the message in its own window, then File, Properties, and copy the Internet headers box.
- Apple Mail: View, Message, All Headers, or press Shift+Cmd+H.
- Thunderbird: Ctrl+U for the full source.
- Yahoo, Proton, Zoho: all offer "view raw message" or "show original" in the message menu.
Copy everything from the first line down to the first blank line. That blank line is the boundary between headers and body, and the body is not needed here. Pasting the whole message works too, because everything after the blank line is ignored.
Which headers do what
Each header is a line of the form Name: value. Names are case-insensitive, and a long value continues on following lines that start with whitespace. The fields fall into a few groups.
- Addresses:
From,Reply-To,To,Cc. The sender writes these, so do not trust them unchecked. - Metadata:
Date,SubjectandMessage-ID, the message's unique identifier, which is how you find it in a sending service's logs. - Route:
Receivedfrom every hop, andReturn-Path. - Authentication:
Authentication-Results,Received-SPF,DKIM-Signatureand theARC-*headers that forwarding servers add. - Content:
MIME-Version,Content-Type,Content-Transfer-Encoding. - Bulk mail:
List-UnsubscribeandList-Unsubscribe-Postfor one-click unsubscribe.
Keep the envelope in mind as well. Servers route a message by the addresses in the SMTP commands (MAIL FROM and RCPT TO), not by the From and To fields. The final server writes the MAIL FROM address into Return-Path, so that header shows the envelope rather than what the reader sees. A Bcc recipient never appears in the headers at all; it exists only in the envelope. The difference is covered in the entry on envelope-from and header-from.
Received: the path, read backwards
Every server that handles a message adds a Received line at the top of the header block, above everything already written. The block therefore ends up in reverse chronological order: the last server to touch the message is the first line you see, and the sender is at the bottom.
This tool flips them, so the first hop shown is where the message started. Each line names the host that handed the message over, the host that took it, the address it came from, and the time. The gap between two timestamps is how long the message waited at that point.
One detail worth knowing: the name in brackets is not what the sending server claimed to be. It is the result of the receiving server looking the address up in reverse DNS. When those two disagree, meaning the server says one name, its address resolves to another, receivers notice, and it is a common reason mail lands in spam with SPF and DKIM configured perfectly.
The word after with tells you how that hop was made. ESMTP means no encryption. RFC 3848 defines ESMTPS as ESMTP with STARTTLS successfully negotiated, while RFC 8314 reads it more broadly, as trace information that TLS was used for the transfer. ESMTPSA adds an authenticated sender through SMTP AUTH. If an external hop lacks the S, the message crossed that stretch in clear text.
Authentication-Results, and how much to trust it
This header records what the receiving server decided about SPF, DKIM and DMARC. It is the closest thing to a verdict a message carries.
It is also, on its own, worthless as evidence. The header is written by whoever received the message, and nothing prevents a sender from writing one themselves, and a forged line is indistinguishable from a genuine one by inspection. What makes it trustworthy is the server that added it. A line added by your own provider on mail you received is meaningful. The same line in a message somebody forwarded you proves nothing at all.
This is exactly why the header block is read from the bottom up. Anything above the point where your own infrastructure took over is the sender's word for it.
Common results and X-headers
spf=none: the envelope domain has no SPF record at all. That is not a failed check but a missing one, and the record should be added.spf=softfail: the server is not listed, and the record ends in~all.dkim=temperror: the receiving server could not fetch the key from DNS. Usually a one-off; if it keeps happening, check the domain's DNS.- Two
DKIM-Signatureheaders: the sending service signed with its domain and with yours. That is normal, and a signature matching From is all DMARC needs.
Besides the standard fields, servers and filters add their own, usually prefixed with X-. RFC 6648 has advised dropping the prefix since 2012, but it stuck. The most useful of these comes from the SpamAssassin filter:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0
tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,SPF_PASS
X-Mailer: Postmarkscore is the total, required is the threshold above which the message counts as spam, and tests lists the rules that fired, which shows exactly what pushed the score up. X-Mailer and similar fields name the program or service that sent the message.
What the DMARC alignment block shows
Here the analysis lists the three domains in the message: the visible sender, the DKIM signing domain and the envelope. DMARC counts a check only when its domain matches the From domain, so mail sent through a provider can pass SPF and DKIM and still fail DMARC: both checks passed for the provider's domain. How relaxed and strict modes work, and how to connect your own domain inside a provider, is covered in the DMARC checker.
What the delays tell you
Seconds between hops are normal. A minute or more usually means one of two things. Either the receiving server had a queue, which is nobody's fault and nothing to fix, or the message was greylisted, deliberately deferred because the sender was unfamiliar, then accepted when the sending server retried a few minutes later.
Greylisting is a useful signal in itself: it happens to new sending addresses and stops happening as they build a history. Seeing it on every message from an address that has been sending for months suggests the receiving side is not recognising you, which usually traces back to reverse DNS or a rotating pool of sending addresses.
What headers cannot tell you
They describe one message on one journey. They say nothing about whether the recipient's address exists, whether the mailbox is full, whether the content triggered a content filter, or what the domain's reputation looks like across a whole campaign. A message can traverse a perfect path with three green checks and still land in Promotions.
For the parts that are configuration rather than delivery, the record checkers are more direct: they read what is published in DNS right now, rather than what one message happened to encounter.
Signs of a phishing email in the headers
A forged message differs from a real one not in its text but in who sent it and from where. Text is easy to fake; headers are hard, because servers add them along the way. Look at these in order.
The From domain proves nothing. It is an ordinary string the sender types in. A message "from the bank" with the bank's domain can be sent by anyone from any server.
Return-Path does not match From. In genuine mail the two are either the same or share an organizational domain. If From says the bank and Return-Path is a random string on a free host, the sender is not who it claims. One caveat: legitimate campaigns sent through a service often have the service's domain in Return-Path.
SPF fail on mail from a well-known company. Large senders always publish SPF. spf=fail in Authentication-Results means the message left a server the domain did not authorize.
No DKIM, or a signature from an unrelated domain. Check the d= tag in DKIM-Signature. If it names a domain unrelated to From, the signature is real but belongs to someone else.
DMARC fails. dmarc=fail means neither SPF nor DKIM aligned with the visible sender. It is the strongest single sign, because it sums up the others.
The Received chain starts in the wrong place. Read it bottom up: the lowest line shows where the message came from. A message supposedly from a local bank that starts on a hosting provider abroad, unrelated to the domain, does not add up.
Headers answer questions about the sender, not the content. A message can be perfectly authenticated and still be fraud: if a real account was hijacked, SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, because the mail really did come from a legitimate server. The reverse holds too. Forwarding breaks SPF and mailing lists often break DKIM, so a lone failure on a message from a colleague usually means an intermediate server, not a forgery.
So read headers alongside common sense. Urgency, a demand to follow a link and enter a password, and a link whose address does not match its text remain signs as weighty as anything in Authentication-Results.
Sources
- RFC 5322, section 2.2: header field format
- RFC 5322, section 3.6: message header fields
- RFC 5321, section 4.4: Received and Return-Path
- RFC 3848: ESMTPS and ESMTPSA in Received
- RFC 8314, section 4.3: TLS in the Received header
- RFC 8601: the Authentication-Results header
- RFC 6648: deprecating the X- prefix
- RFC 8058: one-click unsubscribe
Header questions
Read next
Headers look fine but the list still bounces?
Authentication cannot help with addresses that no longer exist. uChecker verifies your list before you send, and the first 100 addresses are free.
Check your list